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Abstract 
The Public Employment Service often delivers much of the employment policy 
including active labour market programmes in many member states in the EU, yet 
we know little about its effectiveness in general. This paper provides a quantitative 
assessment of the potential impact of the modernisation programme of the 
Hungarian Public Employment service between 2004 and 2008. Using data at the 
level of local offices, I calculate programme effects using a difference-in-difference 
estimator. Results show that the programme has increased re-employment rates 
significantly, by 6%. The modernisation was thus a moderately effective but 
relatively inexpensive intervention, similar in terms of cost-effectiveness to the 
better active labour market programmes in Hungary. 
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Introduction 
The Public Employment Service (PES) is an important player in the labour market 
of almost all European countries, yet we know very little about the effectiveness of 
its operation and development. Within the matching theories of Blanchard and 
Diamond (1989) and Pissarides (2000), the aim of a PES is to facilitate the 
operation of the matching technology. This can involve activities such as 
administering payments to clients, negotiating and supervising job-search 
agreements, counselling, observing compliance and the administration of labour 
market programmes. The PES has always been an important building block of the 
European Employment Strategy and forms part of the Europe 2020 Strategy 
(European Commission, 2010). The PES is a central institution in the so-called 
flexicurity framework and is assigned the role of supporting the transition between 
labour market states (Wilthagen, 2008). Although most member states spent more 
than 0.1 per cent of their GDP on the PES and administration in 2010 (OECD data, 
LMPEXP), there is relatively scarce evidence on the effect of PES services on 
outcomes for the unemployed. This paper addresses the question of improving 
effectiveness by looking at the modernisation of a PES on one of its main 
outcomes, opportunities for re-employment. 
The evaluation of active labour market programmes is recognised today as very 
important and the field has accumulated an impressive body of evidence. These 
studies nevertheless address the issue of programme effectiveness for the most 
part and are strongly separated from the operations of the institution which delivers 
it. One exception is “services and sanctions”, an intervention delivered by and 
integrated with the PES and shown by Kluve (2010) to be one of the most 
successful labour market programmes. The situation is no different in Hungary, a 
country where the employment rate is among the lowest in the EU. With a budget 
of around HUF 20 billion (around EUR 70 million) per year, the Hungarian PES 
serves 450000-600000 registered jobseekers, which is about 11 to15 percent or 
the active population. The institution has absorbed more than HUF 10 billion in the 
2000s in order to modernise its operation, but no quantitative assessment has 
been made about this process so far. 
The contribution of this paper to the scarce literature on PES effectiveness and 
also to the better developed literature on the evaluation of labour market 
programmes is delivering evidence using econometric techniques on the potential 
effectiveness gains through the modernisation of a PES. The questions I would like 
to answer are whether and to what extent the modernisation project contributed to 
increasing the chances of its clients in finding a job. In what follows, I use a 
difference-in-difference (DiD) econometric estimation method to estimate the 
possible effect of the developments between 2004 and 2008, using aggregate data 
relating to the local PES offices. First I briefly describe the development 
programme itself. Then I move onto the theoretical and methodological 
considerations and the data used for the analysis. Thirdly I describe the estimation 
results. Finally, I put them in context and present some conclusions. 
Evidence on PES effectiveness 
Expenditure on labour market policy and the PES is relatively high in the EU, but 
also varies considerably, from 3.48 and 0.51 per cent of the GDP respectively in 
Belgium to 1 and 0.1 per cent respectively in new member states (OECD data, 
LMPEXP). Despite such differences in spending, the need for a public employment 
service was mostly supported since the post-second world war period (Baldwin 
1951) to today (OECD, 2006), and reinforced after the onset of the economic crisis 
(ILO, 2009). 
Critiques of the PES often refer to the ineffectiveness of the institution and such 
doubts are reflected in both spending on and organisation of the PES. Doubts 
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about PES effectiveness have their roots in theory. Zweifel and Zaborowski (1996) 
ask the question if public or private employment services are better. This 
theoretical analysis suggests that private agencies might fare better largely 
because the public agency is not allowed to be selective in its user base and not as 
worried about placements as private agencies. Similar analysis also suggest that 
structure of the market for employment-related institutions matter for effectiveness 
(Campens and Tanguy, 2006). In the presence of privately-owned employment 
offices, otherwise positive performance of public ones can decrease. 
The best arrangement for the employment services is sought after in practice in 
various ways. Denmark has reformed its entire PES by privatising a large part of it 
(Koning 2004). Although it does not directly recommend a complete privatisation, 
the OECD is advising its members to introduce market-based signalling systems so 
that contracting-out of services (Bruttel, 2005) can help improving overall 
effectiveness (Fay, 1997). A less disruptive step towards taking outcomes into 
account is the introduction of management by objectives (Mosley, Schütz, and 
Breyer, 2001), a reform followed by many PES, including the Hungarian one. 
Management of performance is possible without a major change of organisational 
structure, but it requires constant and appropriate monitoring and evaluation of 
PES-related operations (OECD, 2005). Very few PES monitor effectiveness directly 
(or at least openly), perhaps because such measurement has its own problems. 
Among the few studies embarking on direct effectiveness measurement, we find 
Vassiliev et al. (2006) and Ramirez and Vassiliev (2006). Both use a form of 
production frontier methods to identify offices falling below the expected 
effectiveness threshold, and interpret finding offices below this as those potentially 
able to increase their output given their inputs. 
Besides administering and delivering active labour market programmes, the PES 
often provides “Services and Sanctions, a category comprising all measures aimed 
at increasing job search effectiveness, such as counselling and monitoring, job 
search assistance, and corresponding sanctions in case of non-compliance” 
(Kluve, 2010). Although relatively few, 21 of the observed 137 studies look at this 
type of programme, the meta-analysis of the author yields robust results indicating 
that “Services and Sanctions” is one of the most effective and less costly types of 
ALMP. Out of 3+5 specifications, services and sanctions always increases the 
likelihood of an evaluation finding positive treatment effects and almost always 
highly significantly. This performance is rivalled only by private sector incentive 
schemes, such as wage subsidies, while direct employment programmes for 
example perform much worse. These results are quite important from the point of 
view of the PES, as unlike other programmes, the performance of services and 
sanctions depend highly on its competencies. 
Institutional background 
The Hungarian PES plays the role of both an authority paying financial support to 
the registered unemployed and that of a supporting organisation by providing 
counselling and delivering various active measures to the clients. Beside its core 
duties, it also performs many tasks somewhat loosely related to unemployment, 
including the administration of casual work, administering a large part of the 
rehabilitation process of disabled workers, or assisting public employment. 
Resources of the institution did not however keep up with the proliferation of duties. 
As part of the austerity measures, the number of employees in local offices had 
begun to shrink already in 2006 and did not increase after the onset of the 2008 
crisis either. While one officer attended an average of 206 clients in 2006, the 
same number had increased to 273 by 2009 (figures from direct HPES 
communication). 
The pressure on the PES was relieved to a certain extent by a series of 
development projects started in 2003 and still on going. Its main aim was to carry 
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out a general reform of operations in order to boost its performance in improving 
clients’ re-employment potential. At the end of the 1990s, the operation of local 
PES offices was characterised by very formal and unfriendly spatial arrangements, 
out-dated IT infrastructure and further difficulties. Officers were lacking a general 
overview of competency areas, while clients were not only served by but also 
dependent on them, interested mostly in collecting unemployment insurance and 
benefit payments. Such a situation constrains the ability of the PES to improve 
outcomes for clients and was therefore important to change. The modernisation 
efforts have dealt with all the above-mentioned areas in 20, 60 and another 60 
local offices in the three phases of the modernisation process, respectively. It also 
affected the National Employment Office, the methodological and coordination 
centre of the PES. 
Here I focus in the so-called HRDOP 1.2 measure (with a budget of HUF 9.3 
billion), which was the second among the three phases of modernisation. The aims 
of the development process are mapped onto projects – often overarching actual 
measures or programmes – whose combined effect is what I consider here as the 
intervention to be analysed. A total of 89 projects were targeted on introducing a 
new model of service provision with client profiling, internal remodelling of the local 
offices, installing self-help computer terminals, introduction of a quality assurance 
system, staff training and the introduction of an integrated information system. We 
expect that all of these had an effect on participating offices, while development of 
the integrated information system had an effect on the operations of the whole 
PES, regardless of programme participation. For we need a comparison group to 
measure programme effects, only outcomes for participating offices can be 
measured. 
The principle for assessing impact of the 
modernisation 
The current analysis aims at measuring the effect of the programme on a specific 
indicator – such as the re-employment chance of the registered unemployed – on 
the office-level, similarly to the structure put forward by Nagy (2006) in an earlier 
proposal to estimate programme effects. Being interested in the actual outcome of 
the programme, here I look at the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). 
Such an indicator and approach helps us to answer questions and clarify doubts 
raised by Hárs and Nagy (2009) in relation to the original indicators of the 
programme. Because the analysis is focussed on local labour markets in which the 
PES offices are located, this measurement provides us with an estimate of the net 
effect of the programme, which is the combined effect of the direct effect and 
indirect effects. It also does not count with the possible displacement effects the 
programme generates. Given however that the programme effects extend to every 
registered unemployed, this error is likely to be modest therefore the gross effect is 
likely to be not very different. 
I calculate programme effects using a difference-in-differences (DiD) method from 
raw data, later correct it using linear regression, first applied directly to the affected 
groups of offices, then using matching to homogenise them. The motivation for 
introducing a technique for sample homogenisation is that despite the indication of 
available information, the comparison group might be different from the treated 
group and matching is a preferred method of getting rid of a part of these 
differences explained by observable characteristics   (Heckman, Ichimura and 
Todd, 1998). The total of four versions of the estimates can be used to cross-check 
them, similarly to the ones in the dated but comprehensive evaluation of active 
labour market programmes in Hungary (O’Leary, 1998). 
In order to get rid of the time-invariant effects possibly correlated with programme 
participation, I have written the estimating equation in differences-form: 
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∆OUTit = τ + δpi + β∆Xit + uit, 
where OUTit is the indicator of outcomes, τ is a constant measuring the 
autonomous rate of change in this, pi is an indicator of programme participation, Xit 
is a set of variables indicating relevant observable characteristics of the local 
offices, while uit summarises characteristics that are not correlated with these 
observables. The relationship is defined over PES offices observed in different 
time-points, i being an index for an office, t being an index for a specific time 
period. The difference (∆) operator takes time-difference of a variable between the 
same month in the before and after period – note that office-specific fixed-effects 
has already been swept from this equation. Our interest centres on δ, the 
coefficient on the pi indicator for programme-participation, which delivers the 
programme effect in this context. One can show that the equation in this form is a 
direct implementation of the DiD idea, generalised to the multiple-regression case. 
The first set of estimates come from OLS regression and is based on the 
assumption that the participant and non-participant groups are similar. This 
assumption relies on information on programme design which attempted to select 
offices for modernisation from every county, without direct connection to the state 
of the particular office. Variable ∆Xit ensures that we take into account the 
differences developing over time between the participant and non-participant group 
of offices, and thus we do not confuse these with the effect attributable to the 
programme itself. Not taking these into differences would give us the simplest raw 
DiD estimates of the programme effect. 
The estimation strategy explained above runs into difficulties if the assumption 
about the initial similarity of the groups fails and there are differences between 
participant and non-participant groups that are correlated with the ∆Xit variables or 
with the indicator of participation. We can treat this problem if we have a sufficiently 
large number of variables at our disposal that can actually explain these 
differences to a great extent. Given that that are detailed data on the clients in 
each office, this seems to be possible in our case. To produce the second set of 
estimates, I first perform propensity-score matching following the idea of 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). This procedure amounts to predicting programme 
participation using a large set of pre-participation variables and use the predicted 
propensity to find observations for every programme participant that are close to it 
in some way. After this, I create a counterfactual realisation as a weighted average 
of the neighbours of the given office and compare the actual outcome to that. A 
substantial difference of this approach compared to the previous one is that the 
equation is estimated on a database containing data for the treated group and the 
counterfactual realisation generated from the control group. We get a reliable DiD 
estimate of the ATT under the current working assumptions by subtracting 
participants’ time-difference in outcomes from the same difference for their set of 
pairs assigned through matching, then averaging them (Heckman, Ichimura and 
Todd, 1998). It is important to stay on the common support of the observable 
characteristics during matching, that is only those observations should be matched 
that actually have similar values of variables. Although a similar effect could be 
achieved by homogeneising with OLS – that is including the variables used for 
matching in levels to the estimating equation – the technical power of matching 
over OLS is the flexibility that it introduces hidden non-linearity in controlling for 
differences. Because of this however, the usual way of calculating standard errors 
for the estimator would be misleading. Although there is no clearly preferred 
solution to this problem to my understating, bootstrap estimates are often used and 
this is what I am calculating. 
Matching with simple averaging produces an estimate that is similar to a simple 
DiD estimate in that it does not take care of the over-time changes in 
characteristics between groups happening after the onset of the programme, that is 
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without the ∆Xit variables. If a control for over-time changes is needed, it has to be 
done before matching. As a result, we are not matching on original re-employment 
rates, but rather on residuals from a first-step regression similar to the one used in 
simple OLS estimation but without the programme-participation indicator (this 
process is analogous to the residual-regression approach in the simple OLS 
context). Standard errors have to be calculated using bootstrap as before, for 
which the presence of the generated variables are another reason here. 
The above techniques allow us to control for differences between the treatment 
and the control group both before and after the introduction of the programme in 
observable characteristics. There can however still be correlation between 
observed and unobserved effects. I assume the lack of such effects which I cannot 
prove, only argue for later. Should this argument fail in practice, the amount of the 
inconsistency in such cases depends greatly on the size and direction of effects 
governing such selection. 
Data and the estimation method 
This study uses data primarily from the central database (Integrated System, in 
Hungarian: “Integrált Rendszer”, IR) developed within the framework of the 
HRDOP 1.2 measure itself, containing individual data on the registered 
unemployed since 2000. In order to estimate the programme effect, I was provided 
with these data aggregated at the level of the local offices, done by the 
Employment Office. Using spatial identifiers of the offices, I have attached to these 
records data relating to local labour markets, coming from the database of the 
Hungarian Central Statistics Office in individual settlements (T-STAR). 
Individual-level data on registered clients in the IR contain information on sex, age, 
education, and occupational code of previous job as well as an indicator of 
disability. Aggregate indicators calculated from these data play the role of X 
variables in the estimating equation, characterising the PES offices (with their post-
programme values) on the one hand as well as the role of controlling for initial 
observable differences between participant and non-participant groups (with their 
pre-programme values) in the matching process on the other. The indicators are all 
defined as the share of a particular type of registered client within all registered 
clients. 
In the case of the registered unemployed staying in touch with the local PES office, 
we know the direction of exit at the end of the registered status. The possible 
directions of exit are the following: (1) employment (open market); (2) public works; 
(3) supported employment (various forms of wage subsidy); (4) training; (5) not 
known due to lack of cooperation with the PES. 
The share of registered clients exiting towards either of these directions is an 
estimate of exit probability, an indicator of a certain outcome. Given that the 
primary goal of the PES is to facilitate matching on the labour market, the most 
directly relevant measure of effectiveness is the share of clients exiting the registry 
towards unsupported employment on the open labour market, the rate of re-
employment. Even though the data are aggregate, they are directly related to 
individual behaviour: the number of exits relative to the unemployment pool is an 
analogy of the individual probability of exit. Because the PES produced the exit 
data for different groups of the registered unemployed defined over individual 
characteristics such as age, education or disabled status, I run the regressions for 
all of these groups. Differentiating behaviour on the basis of these groups allowed 
me to assess the heterogeneity in the impact of the programme even with 
aggregate data. 
A great advantage of using data coming from the administrative records of the PES 
is that they are part of a complete account of the event history of the registered 
unemployed, but the administrative nature has drawbacks too. Based on the 
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register only, we know little about the labour market history of those unemployed 
who have not been eligible for financial support. Also, because not all jobseekers 
are strictly required to report the direction of exit, this information is not available 
for everyone. Contact and thus reporting is required in principle and one loses 
eligibility for financial benefits administered by the PES without it. Yet, penalty is 
not severe if the client does not contact the office either due to no initial eligibility in 
the first place or due to having exhausted such benefits, as the unemployed loses 
eligibility for benefit for 3 months. In relation to the current analysis, this means that 
direction of exit is measured without error only for those eligible for benefit. We 
have to note also that this error can be correlated with the factors determining the 
chance of exit and we have no outside information to assess its size. If the 
measurement error is strong, it lowers the value of the outcome variable by not 
counting every successful exit to the open labour market. However, we have no 
reason to suppose that the reverse can happen, so I expect that the error does not 
increase the counted number of exits. 
In order to apply the DiD method here, we have to chose an appropriate before 
and after period. Considering that the HRDOP 1.2 measure was rolled out between 
the second half of 2004 and the first half of 2008 and also that the effects of the 
economic crisis were very apparent in the third quarter of 2008, I chose the first 6 
months of 2004 to be the before and that of 2008 to be the after period. The 
evidence presented in Card, Kluve and Weber (2010) suggests that in order to 
assess the programme effects fully, one should ideally follow and observe 
programme participants for years after the end of the programme – this is definitely 
a longer period than what is possible here. On the one hand, the effect of the 
economic crisis was very asymmetric regionally and extending the observation 
period would run a risk of confounding the effect of the crisis with that of the 
programme. On the other hand, development of the PES has continued through 
the SROP 1.3.1 project, and this has basically eliminating the control group. 
There are 158 local PES offices in the analysis – only those existing both in the 
first half of 2004 and 2008. I have omitted two outlier offices, the one specialised in 
helping homeless people (on Haller Street) and the one specialising in helping 
higher education graduates (the one on Andrássy Street) in Budapest. I have 
omitted also those two offices where all steps of the modernisation were completed 
in the previous round. 
If we are looking only at the formal definitions, we can consider offices modernised 
during the HRDOP 1.2 measure as participants and those not modernised in either 
during the previous phase or during the HRDOP 1.2 measure itself as non-
participants. However, as only 7 offices adopted the quality assurance framework 
during the previous phase and the rest (13) did so only during the HRDOP 1.2 
measure, I consider also the latter as participants for current purposes. Note that 
this does not affect the number of non-participants, as those having participated in 
the previous phase are not counted towards them. The end result is that out of the 
total 158 offices, we have 71 participants and 85 non-participants as their controls. 
As I have already mentioned, participant offices for the development project were 
selected from smaller and larger towns in every county, providing some 
randomness in selection to a certain extent. However, interviews conducted during 
a broader evaluation exercise indicated that participation chances were biased to 
some extent towards offices in worse shape. This observation warrants caution 
towards estimates that do not take such differences into account and prompts at 
least a comparative estimation with homogenisation of treatment and control 
groups based on initial differences between offices. Because it proved to be 
impossible to collect comprehensive information on the actual condition of the 
buildings or on a similar indicator for the pre-programme period, I used the 
characteristics of the clients as a proxy during matching. 
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Figure 1: Monthly exit rates between 2004 and 2008 
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Number of exiting individuals in a group divided by the number of persons in the group prior to exit - 
average, all offices. Source: Own calculation from the IR based on aggregated individual data.  
As the programme elements were delivered at almost the same time to all offices 
(excluding the 13 offices where the self-help terminals and the new service model 
was already in place), we can look at only the combined effect of the installation of 
self-help terminals, the introduction of client profiling and adopting the quality 
assurance system. This means that if we do measure an effect, we cannot tell from 
which programme element it comes. However, if we do not measure an effect, we 
cannot tell if this means that all elements were ineffective or that there are powerful 
effects at work pointing at the opposite directions. 
Figure 1 shows monthly exit rates from the unemployment register between 2004 
and 2008. Based on this evidence, the two major exit directions are 1) open market 
employment, with around 4 per cent rate by the end of the period, 2) not known 
due to lack of reporting back to the PES, with an average of around 8 per cent. 
These figures are similar to those observed in Eastern European countries on 
average (Kuddo, 2009). Besides the slight increase in exit to employment, we can 
observe a much stronger decrease in the exit rate to the not known state. This 
effect is already present from 2000 on (not visible on the graph) which indicates 
that this decrease is not to be attributed to the modernisation process. Exit rates 
towards all destinations also appear to show seasonal cyclicality. Figure 1 shows 
that re-employment rates grow particularly strongly during the summer and 
decreases during the winter – the reason for this is partly that a large number of 
seasonal jobs are offered during the summer and subsidies are made available 
during the spring, take-up rate topping by the end of summer. 
Even though the process started well before 2004, the large and trending decrease 
in the rate of exit towards an unknown state raises the question if there was indeed 
measurement error present in the indicator of the exit route. Such a measurement 
error affects this analysis if the change in exit rates is correlated with the error 
affecting our chosen effectiveness indicator. In that case, those who were likely to 
report an unknown destination are becoming more likely to report exit to an 
unsupported job over time, for example. The most likely cause of this lack of 
information is the lack of motivation to keep in touch with the office. Clients are 
motivated either directly, when contact is required for benefit payment, among 
others, or indirectly, through the provision of services desirable to the client. The 
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participation of an office does not affect administrative rules directly, but clients 
registered with modernised offices can feel contact to be more useful. This can 
lead to more frequent contact between the office and the client, to greater 
likelihood of reporting exit to a job and ultimately to the decrease of the 
measurement error. Such a process creates a negative correlation between 
participating in the modernisation programme and the measurement error in the 
exit rate, leading to the overestimation of the programme effect (by usual omitted 
variable arguments). Although we can be sure that such a distortion exists, I 
suspect that its size is likely to be small. It probably also appears together with 
other noises distorting the estimates in an unknown way – this is a reason I use 
different estimation methods and specifications for measurement. In the absence 
of this negative correlation, measurement error would merely decrease the 
precision of the estimates (appearing on the left hand side of the equation). 
Table 1 shows re-employment rates in the pre- and post-programme period based 
on office-level data, weighted by the number of the number of unemployed 
registered with the given office. The re-employment rate has increased greatly from 
2004 to 2008. Programme participants experienced a 1% point increase, while the 
same was 0.8% point in the case of the control group. Using the DiD method, the 
programme-effect is the difference between these two numbers, 0.23. This number 
is not small compared to the overall re-employment rate, but is not significantly 
different from zero. Looking at the same thing from a different angle, we see that 
the initial gap between the participant and non-participant offices in re-employment 
rates in 2004 has basically vanished by 2008. 
Table 1: Average re-employment rates at the PES offices by HRDOP 1.2 
programme participation status and time-period 
Year Participant? Difference 
 No Yes  
2004 0.0414 0.0386 –0.0028 
2008 0.0496 0.0491 –0.0005 
Difference 0.0082 0.0105 0.0023 
Note: Without participants of the first phase of the modernisation process; averages are weighted by the 
number of unemployed registered with the local office. Source: Own calculations using data aggregated 
from the IR of the PES 
Using data aggregated to the level of the whole country, Figure 2 shows the 
changing share of vulnerable client groups over time. These include those without 
a maturity exam, those aged above 50 (the 50+), labour market entrants and 
disabled persons (counting them multiply, hence proportions add up to more than 
100). The most pronounced change is the growth of the share of the 50+ among 
the registered clients, being a mere 15% in 2000, but growing by 5% points in 10 
years. This is partly explained by the rise in retirement age, partly by the 
autonomous increase in their level of education. The share of those without a 
maturity exam decreased slowly but steadily, showing a strong seasonal pattern: it 
decreased rapidly during the summer months providing seasonal jobs, but 
increased during the winter. The share of labour market entrants shows more 
muted, but still strong seasonality, with a reversed time-pattern: their share 
increases mostly during the summer. Their record high share was 10% during 
2006. The share of the disabled unemployed is stable below the level of 5% from 
2002 on. These changes do vary substantially at the level of local offices and are 
an important part of the external effects we have to control for during estimation. 
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Figure 2: Average composition of the local PES offices between January 2004 and 
December 2008 
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Source: Own calculations using data aggregated from the IR of the PES 
When using a DiD method, it is important to have sufficiently similar participants 
and non-participants on average so that the latter form a valid control group of the 
former. Table 2 shows the average of indicators of offices’ characteristics in the 
beginning of 2004, just before programme participation. There are three types of 
indicators: one set includes the characteristics of the registered unemployed, the 
second includes their exit rates towards different directions and the third includes 
characteristics of the local labour market. The latter were obtained from the on-line 
public database of the Hungarian Statistics Office on municipalities. Given that 
more than one municipality belongs to one local PES office, I have aggregated 
these data and then assigned them to the record of the appropriate local office 
using the matching file provided by the Employment Office. I have considered 
Budapest the capital as one labour market, so the same trends are matched to all 
offices there. These data enable us to control for external – such as business cycle 
– effects not captured already by the changing composition of the registered 
unemployed pool. 
Participating and non-participating local offices appear to be very similar: there is 
no real difference either in re-employment chances, or in local labour market in 
terms of group means. The main difference is that there are almost twice as many 
clients registered with participating offices on average than in the case of non-
participants whereas the share of better educated clients is larger in the latter case 
(with very low absolute shares). Not only the mean values are very similar, but also 
the spread of the indicators (not shown in the table), therefore the requirement of 
staying on the common support during the DiD analysis with matching was easy to 
satisfy. 
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Table 2: Main observable characteristics of participating and non-participating local 
PES offices in the beginning of 2004 
 Participant Non-participant 
Average number of clients of the local office 1531 3090 
Re-employment rate in the given subgroup of the registered 
unemployed   
Age: 15–25 4.3 4.1 
Age: 26–50 4.4 4.1 
Age: 50+ 3.1 2.9 
Education: without maturity exam (including lower secondary 
vocational education) 3.9 3.6 
Education: with maturity exam 4.9 5.0 
Education: higher education 5.5 5.3 
Education: lower secondary vocational education 5.1 4.8 
Disabled 2.5 2.6 
Not labour market entrant 4.5 4.2 
The share of the given subgroup among all the registered 
unemployed   
Age: 15–25 14.7 14.5 
Age: 50+ 19.4 19.3 
Education: without maturity exam (including lower secondary 
vocational education) 75.9 77.5 
Education: higher education 3.2 2.4 
Not labour market entrant 7.3 6.8 
Characteristics of the local labour market   
Registered unemployed/15–65 year olds (%) 8.2 8.5 
Total personal income tax collected/taxpayer (in thousand 
forints, on 2008 prices) 262 249 
Number of flat built/1000 inhabitant 5.8 5.1 
Enterprise/1000 inhabitant 152.6 143.6 
Non-profit organisation/1000 inhabitant 10.4 10.2 
Share of children in créches (among the 0-2 year olds, %) 7.9 7 
Net in-migration/1000 inhabitant –0.7 –1.3 
Source: Own calculations using data aggregated from the IR of the PES and TSTAR data from the 
Hungarian Statistics Office 
I work with aggregate data during estimation, in which observations appear more 
than once and this has a direct effect on the calculation of standard errors of the 
estimates. In order to take seasonal effects into account and increase efficiency at 
the same time, I use observations for 6 months separately for each office in the 
period before and after the programme, respectively. This way every observation 
contributes six times to the estimation, and the final estimate will be an average of 
the monthly effects. Since there is a high degree of autocorrelation between the 
time-periods, I calculate clustered standard errors. Aggregation of units with 
different number of observations in them creates a well-known form of 
heteroskedasticity, therefore I weight the regressions by the number of registered 
individuals. 
Explanatory variables in the binary model for programme participation include the 
2004 January values of the variables characterising local labour markets in the 
parametric estimating equations, as well as levels, squares and cross-products of 
outflow rates towards unsupported employment and unknown direction. I have 
calculated z-statistics using the bootstrap method, with 100 replications. I have 
used the PSMATCH2 Stata module for matching (Leuven and Sianesi 2003). I 
experimented with different averaging methods such as 1:1, k-nearest neighbour, 
kernel and local linear matching. 
Estimation results 
I start presenting results with estimated coefficients from simple OLS regression of 
the differenced estimating equation, using the method explained earlier, including 
restriction to the common support obtained from the participation equation in the 
matching estimator. It is worth noting that without this restriction, results are 
stronger than we shall see. Estimates related to the re-employment chances of an 
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average registered unemployed person are shown in Table 3, the programme 
effect being the coefficient on the participation indicator in the first row. Results 
from the simplest specification (1) merely echo the results seen in Table 1, 
indicating a programme effect of 0.16%point, or 5% (the numerical difference is 
due to slight differences in aggregation). This estimate is not significant at 
conventional levels. Besides the lack of certain control variables, this can be due to 
the negative bias caused by measurement error. Although I am interested in the 
precise estimation of the programme effect rather than modelling of the change 
itself, it is interesting that the equation explains very little of the variation in the 
change in effectiveness. Specification (2) improves upon this situation by including 
separate indicators for all months to filter out seasonal effects. Although this has 
increased explanatory power to 14%, indicating the importance of seasonality in re-
employment, neither the estimate of the programme effect nor its precision has 
changed. 
Specification (3) includes even more information, most importantly the (difference 
of the) share of registered clients with particular characteristics: age, education, 
and labour market entrant status. Besides the rise in explanatory power, we 
observe an increase in the programme effect to 0.3% point and an improvement in 
precision that makes the estimate significant. The size of the effect is close to the 
one obtained with matching (see later), but is somewhat larger than the raw 
estimate. Variables included in this specification capture the changes in clients’ 
composition over four years. 
The coefficients attached to specification (3) should be interpreted with a caveat: 
their own effect is biased by their possible role of a proxy for the measurement 
error and I am not able to disentangle the two. In a further specification for 
checking robustness (not shown here) I included the rate of exit towards unknown 
state as a proxy for measurement error. This variable carries a lot of extra 
information and being a dominant share in the same population, it is very likely to 
“over-control” the programme effect. Including this variable, the programme effect 
has increased marginally and its significance decreased (but results remained 
significant). 
In the next step, I have included variables in the estimation that are meant to 
capture the characteristics of the local labour market. Results obtained with the 
new specification (4) are similar to what we have got in the first two, with not only 
the programme effect, but significance dropping too. Along with the increase in the 
explanatory power of the model, this shows that there is insufficient information for 
this extension of the model: multicollinearity between the variables decreases 
precision more than the value of the extra information they bring in. Although the 
new estimate of the programme effect is smaller than it was before, the confidence 
interval around it is wide enough to include the previous estimate. For this reason, I 
use specification (3) as my preferred one in what follows. 
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Table 3: Results from DiD OLS regressions in various specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HRDOP 1.2. participant 0.0016 0.0016 0.0030* 0.00167 
 (0.431) (0.433) (0.0952) (0.342) 
Age: 15–25   –0.000919 0.000540 
   (0.991) (0.994) 
Age: 50+   0.0716 0.111** 
   (0.225) (0.0357) 
Education: without maturity exam 
(including lower secondary vocational 
education) 
  0.0259 0.0214 
   (0.703) (0.729) 
Education: higher education   0.367** 0.240* 
   (0.0123) (0.0780) 
Not labour market entrant   –0.188*** –0.137** 
   (0.00339) (0.0247) 
Disabled   –0.154** –0.0648 
   (0.0264) (0.336) 
Registered unemployed/15–65 year 
olds (%)    –0.313*** 
    (8.50e–05) 
Total personal income tax 
collected/taxpayer (in thousand forints, 
on 2008 prices) 
   –3.26e–05 
    (0.419) 
Number of flat built/1000 inhabitant    0.0223 
    (0.965) 
Enterprise/1000 inhabitant    0.0306** 
    (0.0419) 
Non-profit organisation/1000 
inhabitant    2.077 
    (0.216) 
Share of children in créches (among 
the 0-2 year olds, %)    –0.0391 
    (0.473) 
Net in-migration/1000 inhabitant    –0.153 
    (0.217) 
Constant 0.00852*** 0.00874*** 0.00653*** 0.00980** 
 (6.36e–09) (1.06e–09) (0.00859) (0.0221) 
N (on common support)/All 
observations 834/948 834/948 834/948 834/948 
R2 0.02 0.14 0.22 0.28 
Estimated coefficients with p-values within parentheses below them. * significant at 0.10 level, ** 
significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level. 
After the completely parametric estimates, I turn to matching to take into account 
possible initial differences between the local offices, which I have assumed away 
so far. Table 4 shows estimated programme effects and associated bootstrap z-
statistics from simple DiD matching using various methods. The programme effect 
is the average effect on the treated, the average time-difference of the average 
difference between re-employment rates of participant local offices and their 
synthetic counterfactual realisations. Estimates constrained to the common 
support, programme effects are positive in all cases, but are insignificant and 
smaller in magnitude than raw effects in the case of averaging methods using all 
data, such as the kernel and local linear methods. Based on lessons from  scenario 
4 of Frölich (2004) relating to the analysis of groups of small and similar size, 
results using these non-parametric methods are the most credible and I consider 
these as a preferred specification. 
Table 4: Raw programme effects estimated with matching 
 1:1 5 nearest neighbour Local linear Kernel 
Estimated programme-effects 0.0039 0.0059** 0.0019 0.0016 
Bootstrap z-statistics 1.41 2.03 0.69 0.71 
** Significant at the 5% level. Local linear estimation uses Epanechnikov kernel with the default 
bandwidth of 0.06. 
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The next step is to combine matching and parametric estimation in order to control 
for both initial differences and changes in characteristics during the programme 
period using the two-step method outlined earlier. Based on earlier results, I use 
the kernel method in matching and include the parametric residual-generation in 
the bootstrap procedure used for the z-statistics of significance of the parameters. 
Table 5: Programme effect calculated with matching on residuals obtained from 
DiD OLS regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimated programme-effects 0.0016 0.0051* 0.0048* 0.0043 
Bootstrap z-statistics (0.71) (1.81) (1.76) (1.55) 
* Significant at the 10% level. Matching is performed using the kernel averaging method. Regression 
preprocessing uses specification (3) from Table 3. 
Results from controlled matching are shown in Table 5 following the structure 
adopted in Table 3. Controlling for seasonality made the smallest difference here, 
the programme effect increasing to 0.5% point and being significant at the 0.01 
level. This value decreases slightly but not significantly after including the 
composition of the client pool of the local offices. Including characteristics of the 
local labour markets has a similar effect, decreasing both the level and the 
significance of the programme effect. For the same reasons explained earlier, the 
most credible and thus preferred results come from specification (3). Replacing raw 
numbers with those coming from a multivariate DiD method combined with 
matching has thus small but significant net effects. These estimates benefit from 
correcting for both initial differences and those developing over time, and can thus 
be regarded as more credible than those ignorant of such differences. 
Working with numbers aggregated over the whole client pool, we could not so far 
look at the heterogeneity of the programme effect. Although we cannot separate 
effects that are attributable to different types of interventions due to the lack of 
appropriate data, we can attempt to estimate this composite effect local to different 
subgroups of clients. Given that some parts of the programme have targeted some 
types of clients, we can actually obtain some information that can be related to 
specific parts of the programme. One example of this is self-help terminals which 
are more targeted on the better educated clients: obtaining a positive programme 
effect of the latter makes it more likely that elements targeted at them could have 
worked better. The new service model on the other hand is more likely to benefit 
the less able, where we can apply the same argument. This makes it worthwhile to 
replicate the above analysis using figures that are aggregated for a specific type of 
client only. Another dimension of the heterogeneity of the programme effect is the 
direction of exit. It is possible for example that the new service model is more 
effective in directing clients towards training, but not so effective in directing them 
towards employment. For this reason, it is also worth replicating the analysis for 
different outcome indicators. 
In order to take a look at the effect of modernisation on different groups of clients 
and with regard to different outcome indicators, I have replicated the analysis for all 
combinations of these using different populations and outcome indicators. Table 6 
shows the essence of the results as a collection of estimates of the programme 
parameters from a regression specified as version (3) in Table 3. Figures marked 
with a star show coefficients that are significant at a minimum of 0.1 level. 
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Table 6: Programme effects for different subgroups of registered unemployed and 
for different exit directions 
 
Employment 
(open 
market) 
Public works 
Other active 
labour 
market 
programme 
Training Unknown direction 
Age: 15–25 0.0025 –0.0002 –0.0009 –0.0005 –0.0046 
Age: 26–50 0.0034* 0.0012 0.0000 –0.0002 –0.0016 
Age: 50+ 0.0018 0.0006 –0.0003 –0.0001 –0.0027 
Education: without 
maturity exam 
(including lower 
secondary vocational 
education) 
0.0029 0.0011 0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0019 
Education: with 
maturity exam 0.0028 –0.0004 0.0001 –0.0005 –0.0028 
Education: higher 
education –0.0021 0.0010 –0.0053* –0.0001 –0.0023 
Education: lower 
secondary vocational  
education 
0.0032 0.0004 0.0003 –0.0002 –0.0020 
Disabled 0.0038 –0.0001 –0.0015 –0.0002 –0.0073 
Not labour market 
entrant 0.0057* –0.0011 0.0009 0.0007 –0.0019 
Education: lower 
secondary vocational  
education 
0.0034 0.0009 –0.0003 –0.0002 –0.0026 
* Significant at least at the 0.1 level. Estimated using specification (3) from Table 3, weighted with the 
number of registered clients within the target group, constrained to the common support 
The main conclusion from Table 6 is that the programme helped open-market 
employment the most: two out of three significant effects are estimated in this 
case. The table shows that the 0.3% point average estimate of the programme 
effect is an average of larger and significant impacts on a few subpopulations with 
a large number of members on the one hand and smaller and less significant 
effects on more subpopulations with fewer members on the other. While we do not 
see a significant effect in the case of the young and the 50+ in the case of open-
market employment, the effect for the prime-age group is well above the average 
at 0.38% point. There is no real difference in terms of education attainment, but 
coefficients are rather imprecisely estimated in that case. Finally, the effect for 
those already on the labour market is significantly larger than the average. Other 
coefficients are not significant at conventional levels, except the exit rate towards 
ALMPs for those with higher education, where the programme effect is negative 
and significant. If this effect is real, it can be attributed to the better information 
provided and the selection mechanism put to work and can suggest that less 
participation in ALMPs might be appropriate for this group. 
Conclusions 
This study has provided additional evidence to the effectiveness of a public 
employment service as an employment policy measure. It presented a quantitative 
evaluation of the effect of the 2004-2008 phase of the modernisation of the Public 
Employment Service in Hungary, using exit chances from the unemployment 
registry as outcomes. The analyses used matching to control for initial differences 
between participant and non-participant local offices in terms of the composition of 
their clients and also takes over-time changes into account. Based on the results, 
we can conclude that the modernisation had a significant positive effect on re-
employment chances and this is robust to various changes in the specification. 
Although data restrictions did not allow me to separate the effects of different 
programme elements, analysis of subgroups revealed that the programme effect 
was strongest in the case of prime-age workers.  
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The final numerical results include several corrections and are slightly larger than 
the one obtained from averaging raw numbers. During the period between 2004 
and 2008, re-employment chances have risen from 3.86% to 4.91% in local offices 
that participated in the modernisation programme. I estimate that out of this almost 
1 percentage point change, the impact of the programme was around 0.30-0.48 
percentage points. In the first half of 2008, the number of registered unemployed 
was 450000, of which 263000 were registered with programme participant local 
offices. Given that 5% of them became employees on the open labour market after 
one month, approximately 800-1200 of them became employed as a result of the 
development programme. The approximately 5% exit rate measured in 2008 
means that the average length of such a spell is 100/5 = 20 month (assuming a 
constant hazard of exit). In the counterfactual case of the programme not being 
rolled out, based on the change in exit probability as a result of the programme, we 
can calculate this duration to be 100/(5 - 0.3) = 21.3 to 100/(5 - 0.48) = 22.1 
months. This means that the length of the unemployment spell was shortened by 
1.3-2.1 months by the programme for clients registered with the participating local 
offices. 
Because the development of the PES can be considered as a labour market 
programme similar to ALMPs, one might want to ask the question how the benefits 
from the modernisation effort compare to costs and to alternative programmes. The 
first question is not easy to answer, because parts of the programme are difficult to 
separate and even if this were possible, their costs are difficult to account for. In 
the extreme case of interpreting the programme as an impulse that creates an 
everlasting effect, the expense of HUF9100 million is equivalent to an annual cost 
of HUF273 million spent forever. If we assume that the modernisation is a 
“programme” in which all unemployed registered with the participant local offices 
benefit and divide this cost among them, this spending amounts to a yearly 
HUF1038 thousand, a monthly HUF86 thousand cost. Comparing this to monthly 
costs of training programmes and subsidies for self-employment, being a monthly 
HUF101000 and HUF177000 per capita respectively, the modernisation is not only 
effective, but does not appear to be costly either (see table 12.4 and 12.5 in Bálint, 
2012). 
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